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Economic Perspective 1 
THE HEW FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTOR PROTECTION: CMSD 9M32 
Paul Draper, Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde 
Worried by the prospect of as yet 
undiscovered frauds and the siphoning off 
of millions from the pockets of the public 
to those of some crooked tycoon, the 
Government has in i t s recent White Paper 
(Cmnd 9432) introduced new proposals for 
the regulation of investment business. 
The new proposals are designed to provide 
the public with additional safeguards that 
prevent fraud malpractice. To this end, 
a statutory framework i s proposed within 
which two self-regulatory bodies function 
w i t h t h e aim of e n c o u r a g i n g " t h e 
commitment of individuals in the financial 
services industry to high standards". 
The Securi t ies and Investment Board i s 
r e spons ib le for the r e g u l a t i o n of 
s e c u r i t i e s and inves tmen t s , and the 
Marketing of Investments Board for the 
regulation of marketing of pre-packaged 
investments. 
The need for increased investor protection 
i s not in dispute. The d i s t r e s s caused 
by the investment collapse of Norton 
Warburg, for example, i s s t i l l fresh in 
the memory and the need for t i g h t e r 
controls self evident. The proposals for 
investor protection, whilst welcome, are 
not, however, above criticism and in some 
areas changes in emphasis could bring 
about even greater improvements than those 
currently envisaged. The proposals of 
the White Paper are designed to encourage 
efficiency, competitiveness, confidence 
and flexibility. These objectives are to 
be met by ac t i ons t h a t apply the 
principles of prevention of fraud; the 
vigorous enforcement of a simplified 
investment law based on a c l e a r l y 
understood set of general pr inciples and 
r u l e s ; equivalence of t r ea tmen t for 
products and services competing in the 
same market; and a commitment to self-
regulation. Market forces are to be 
encouraged by bringing the forces of 
competition to bear on practitioners and 
in s t i t u t i ons and by providing as much 
information as possible about the services 
and investments on offer to the customer. 
The White Paper makes i t clear that the 
intent ion i s not to re l ieve the investor 
of responsibility for exercising judgement 
and care in deciding how to invest his 
money but rather that i t endeavours to 
strengthen, the principle of caveat emptor 
by reducing the likelihood of fraud. 
The approach set out in the White Paper i s 
to protect investors by r e s t r i c t i n g the 
range of investments and advice they are 
offered. I t s philosophy i s to prevent 
investors from coming into contact with 
inves tments t h a t a re not properly 
documented and assessed, and from being 
offered advice by those who might t ry to 
take advantage of them. Admirable as 
these sentiments may be they are unlikely 
to be successful. This approach forces 
the legislation into tight definitions of 
what c o n s t i t u t e s an investment and 
•investment business1 since to control the 
investments on offer and the advice being 
given i t i s necessary to control those who 
a r e a b l e t o o f f e r a d v i c e or s e l l 
investments. 
Investments are defined to cover a wide 
range of secur i t i es including shares, 
fixed interest stock, options and warrants 
as well as financial and commodity futures 
and participatory rights in other forms of 
property, but the definition used excludes 
alternative investments such as paintings, 
stamps, wine and other s imilar assets . 
These exclusions are hardly surprising 
given the dif f icul ty of distinguishing 
between legi t imate col lect ing for fun, 
enjoyment or study and accumulation for 
t h e p u r p o s e s of i n v e s t m e n t . 
Unfortunately, some of the worst excesses 
of the investment industry have involved j u s t such investments and i t i s not too 
rash to predict that such assets wi l l 
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feature even more prominently in the 
scandals of the future. 
The d i f f icu l ty of specifying exactly the 
na tu re of ' i nves tment bus ines s ' i s 
recognised by the intent ion to cover any 
business which t r a n s a c t s bus ines s in 
investments, manages investments including 
unit t r u s t s , p ro f fe r s adv ice , i s sues 
promotional material or even publishes 
t i p s h e e t s . Cer ta in excep t ions are 
suggested, however, including investment 
trust companies, bona fide newspapers and 
the p r e p a r a t i o n and p u b l i c a t i o n of 
a n a l y t i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h o u t 
recommendations. Investment t r u s t 
companies and the i r employees managing 
the i r company's investments are exempted 
because the Government could see "nothing 
to d i f f e ren t i a t e them (such employees) 
from the employees of any other company". 
I t i s , however, difficult to see why they 
should be sub j ec t t o r e g u l a t i o n any 
different from that facing uni t t r u s t s , 
given tha t both inves tment v e h i c l e s 
perform the same func t ions and are 
frequently managed by the same people. 
The inclusion of t ipsheets but exclusion 
of newspapers and, more p a r t i c u a r l y , 
f inancial j ou rna l i s t s represents another 
example of the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the 
Government's approach. Many financial 
j o u r n a l i s t s provide advice to t h e i r 
readers. Is there any reason why they 
should be exempt from the provisions of 
the legislation? 
The proposals recognise that professionals 
and "people who, though not professionals, 
are sufficiently expert to understand the 
r i s k s i n v o l v e d in l e s s o r thodox 
inves tmen t s , and have ample enough 
financial resources to take such r i sks" 
should be allowed information and offers 
that are not allowable to the public at 
large. I t suggests tha t such an exempt 
category may be defined by s ta tu te or 
alternatively an obligation may be laid on 
an investment business to exercise care 
and to d i s t r ibu te information only to 
persons who appear to have the requis i te 
unders tanding and r e s o u r c e s . Such 
provisions raise two questions. First i s 
i t right to res t r ic t access to investment 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o a s e l e c t group? 
Secondly should insti tutions be placed in 
the p o s i t i o n of d e c i d i n g whe the r 
particular individuals have the necessary 
resources and experience to participate in 
"less orthodox investments"? 
These issues are important. The White 
Paper aims to protect by r e s t r i c t i n g 
access to the investment business and by 
regulating the flow of investments and 
information to investors . The cost of 
such an approach is to res t r ic t the right 
of any individual to invest in any manner 
he sees f i t . Individuals who would 
otherwise choose to step outside the 
prevailing investment orthodoxy, whether 
from i g n o r a n c e or knowledge, a re 
r e s t r a i n e d from fol lowing t h e i r own 
inclinations. 
The proposed legislation places particular 
emphas i s on t h e a u t h o r i s a t i o n of 
i n v e s t m e n t b u s i n e s s e s and on a 
demonstration t h a t they are ' f i t and 
proper' . To qualify the business w i l l 
need to provide informat ion t o the 
s tatutory boards about i t s e l f and the 
business which i t proposes to conduct, 
together with de ta i l s of i t s d i rec tors , 
con t ro l l e r s , managers, employees and 
connected persons. Exclusion may only be 
based on c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of p rob i t y , 
competence or adequacy of f i n a n c i a l 
r e s o u r c e s , a l t h o u g h t h e r e i s no 
explanation of how these may be assessed. 
Rules for the conduct of business are 
ou t l i ned which enshr ine a number of 
laudable object ives , eg safeguarding 
against abuses from conflict of interest, 
protection of clients assets, compensation 
for investors, disclosure of the terms of 
business, the keeping of proper records 
and the p rov is ion of investment and 
dealing recommendations that are adequate 
and reasonable "having regard to the 
n a t u r e of t h e i n v e s t m e n t and t h e 
circumstances of the c l ient" . Those 
offering advice are expected to "know your 
cus tomer" and t o t a i l o r a d v i c e 
accordingly. In i t s e l f t h i s i s good 
investment p r a c t i c e but i t must be 
recognised that ult imately decisions are 
made by the i nves to r and not by h i s 
a d v i s o r s . What i s r equ i red i s the 
information tha t enables him to make 
sensible and ra t ional decisions. There 
is no suggestion that advisers should open 
themselves up to public scrutiny providing 
s t a t i s t i c s on the performance of the i r 
recommendations, the r e su l t s of the i r 
managed accounts or the average size of 
commissions paid to stockbrokers as a 
result of their suggestions. Information 
of this type would allow investors to make 
informed judgements about the quality of 
the advice they are being given and enable 
them to decide how reasonable the 
recommendations of their advisers are. 
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The desire to protect by placing the 
burden on advisers to have a knowledge of 
the i r c l i en t s ' needs and requirements i s 
reasonable . I t appears to offer a 
solution to problems where individuals are 
sold investment schemes that are to ta l ly 
unsuitable to t he i r needs and resu l t in 
them losing a l l , or a substantial part of 
the i r savings. The advisers are made 
liable and compulsory compensation schemes 
will reimburse the unfortunates affected. 
Unfortunately, such a system requires a 
control of the investment business that 
may well prove unnecessarily r e s t r i c t i ng 
to other i n v e s t o r s and perhaps more 
importantly, i s unlikely to be successful 
since those who prof i t from the sale of 
such schemes wi l l find loopholes and 
investments outside the scope of the Act. 
To prevent conf l ic ts of i n t e re s t the 
proposals impose duties of sk i l l , care and 
dil igence as well as fa i r dealing and 
disclosure. The clients ' interests must 
be paramount. The process of 'churning' 
a managed portfol io so as to generate 
commission income i s explicitly condemned. 
But l i t t l e guidance on the interpretation 
of these duties i s provided. How i s one 
to assess s k i l l , care and diligence in 
making recommendations? How i s one to 
decide if turnover i s for the legi t imate 
adjustment of a por t fol io to changed 
conditions rather than for generating 
commission? Turnover of v i r tua l ly a l l 
investment vehicles appears too high when judged against the findings of academic 
performance studies. Are we going to see 
the Securities and Investment Board which 
covers the regulation of securities and is 
composed of "those who provide and those 
who use f inancial services" suggesting 
th is? I s there real ly any hope that 
investment recommendations based on 
techniques that have proved impossible to 
sc ien t i f i ca l ly validate as being at a l l 
useful - the sole use of charts to make 
decisions being a case in point - will be 
deemed inadequate and not employing ski l l , 
c a r e and d i l i gence? The proposed 
leg is la t ion provides fine ringing words 
but will i t deliver the goods? Except in 
the most blatant misuse of clients ' funds 
i t i s extremely unlikely! 
The Marketing of Investments Board, the 
second of the two s t a t u t o r y boards 
proposed, will monitor the marketing and 
advising of 'pre-packaged' investments. 
The rules for the Board will require that 
independent intermediaries act in the 
interests of their clients and do not fal l 
under the influence of suppliers. To 
protect customers, i t i s proposed that 
rigorous disclosure requirements should 
provide information on commissions and 
other indirect payments and benefits in 
kind. Insurance brokers en t i t l ed to 
commission from an insurance company for a 
par t icu lar policy wil l be required to 
disclose that payment. These proposals 
are long overdue. The White Paper 
suggests that these requirements might be 
implemented e i ther by requiring specific 
d e t a i l s of charges to be given to the 
c l i en t or by providing the customer with 
an undertaking that the charges f a l l 
within l i m i t s prescribed by voluntary 
agreement. I t i s to be hoped that the 
f i r s t route prevai ls . I t i s clearly 
desirable that i n v e s t o r s should know 
exactly how much they are being charged in 
commission and should be encouraged to 
shop around accordingly. The information 
made available to the c l ien t should not 
stop there. Institutions must be forced 
to provide clients with more information 
d e t a i l i n g how t h e i r money i s being 
employed and the comparative success of 
the managers. Such comparisons must be 
relevant and meaningful, rather bet ter 
than much current advertising which i s 
u n i n f o r m a t i v e i f not m i s l e a d i n g . 
Comparisons with the FT Ordinary share 
index, a popular standard, are biased in 
favour of the portfol ios as a resu l t of 
the method by which the index i s 
cons t ruc t ed . Outperforming the FT 
Ordinary may j u s t be a s t a t i s t i c a l 
a r t e f a c t with no r e a l bas i s w h i l s t 
carefully selected comparison periods may 
present a less than fa i r picture to the 
investor. Investors should be provided 
with the information that enables them to 
spot such unfair practices. 
The proposals are silent on the important 
role of educating the customers to make 
r a t i o n a l and s e n s i b l e dec i s ions for 
themselves. Monitoring the advisers i s a 
beginning but i t is not enough. Academic 
studies provide extensive evidence that 
c u r r e n t p r a c t i c e s a r e not a lways 
beneficial to investors. Self-regulation 
is unlikely to be the answer in such 
cases. 
What of Scotland in al l this? The White 
Paper makes no specific proposals for 
either separate boards for Scotland or any 
provisions that might recognise a need for 
Scotland to be treated different ly . If 
66 
Edinburgh r e t a i n s a more t r ad i t iona l 
specialist investment business as opposed 
to the diversified, financial conglomerate 
route that many London-based institutions 
appear to be following, i t may well be the 
case that the needs and concerns of the 
centres diverge. The Boards may not then 
always best r e f l ec t the views of the 
S c o t t i s h i n s t i t u t i o n s and, more 
i m p o r t a n t l y , of S c o t t i s h consumers. 
Recognition of the d i s t inc t ive Scottish 
t r a d i t i o n of somewhat conse rva t i ve 
investment p r a c t i c e s and of s t rong 
overseas interests should be an aim of the 
legislation. Consumer protection should 
not mean a reduction in the d ivers i ty of 
sound investment s t ra tegies and policies 
open to investors . Recognition of a 
Scottish dimension should not, however, be 
taken as an excuse for unthinking 
t r ad i t iona l po l ic ies . Low turnover may 
be a virtue but small holdings, excessive 
d ivers i f i ca t ion and an i nab i l i t y to reap 
economies of scale are not. 
The aims of the l eg i s l a t i on are worthy. 
The mechanism to effect these aims seems 
somewhat weaker. The l eg i s l a t i on may 
prevent the worst abuses but one cannot 
but have the gravest doubts about i t s 
abi l i t ies to ensure 'best practice' and to 
protect consumers from excessive charging, 
poor (but not fraudulent) decisions and 
biased advice. Within the suggested 
framework much more could be accompolished 
by providing i n v e s t o r s with as much 
information as possible so that investors 
themselves are in a posit ion to make 
informed judgements. This means tha t 
information must be forthcoming on a l l 
aspects of the investment process. To 
focus primarily on company secu r i t i e s , 
unit trusts and l i fe assurance is to miss 
the important requirement for appraisal 
and evaluation of the en t i r e industry by 
all involved in the investment process. 
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